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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 99 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 25/05/1997 
Where it occurred: Chawni Village, Ali 
Khail District, Paktia 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
hard 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
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vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for four years. The time of his last revision course was not 
recorded. He had last been on leave 27 days before the accident. The ground in the area was 
described as a hard and bushy hillside beside a river. A photograph showed it as hard with 
low, sparse bush.  
The investigators determined that the victim was marking the cleared area up to a mine he 
had uncovered and which was awaiting detonation. It was near the end of the day so he 
wanted to go off duty after the found mine was destroyed. He dropped a stone close (25cm) 
to the found mine and the impact detonated another mine close by. His visor was up at the 
time, so his face was unprotected. The mine was identified as a PMN [presumably by 
inference]. 
The Team Leader said that the deminer was marking the area without permission and was 
careless. 
The victim said he was busy marking the area when the accident occurred and he did not 
know why it had happened. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was negligent and rushed to mark the area before 
the destruction of the mine. They said he should not have marked the area prior to 
destruction, and should have kept at least 50cm from the found mine. His section Leader 
showed "poor performance and control". 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the Section Leader be disciplined for poor performance; 
that deminers should not hurry and command group must control this; that, when marking 
cleared areas, a 50cm safety margin must be left; and that all Site Operations Officers should 
attend a specified training course. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 132 Name: [Name removed]  
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%) Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Helmet 
 












See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: both eyes, right fingers, deep lacerations to right 
hand, superficial wounds to forehead, arm, chest and both lower legs.  
A medical report stated that both eyes were injured, his right index finger was amputated, and 
he sustained fractures to his right middle and ring fingers, a deep wound to his right palm, and 
superficial wounds to his left forearm, chest and both legs.  
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) added a burn to the face.  
 
A photograph showed both hands discoloured. 
The demining group submitted a disability claim on 13th August 1997 in which they described 
the victim's injuries as: injuries to both eyes and face, amputation of right index finger and 
fracture of two other right hand fingers. They said he had suffered loss of vision to both eyes 
of 100%.  
A disability payment of 500,000 Rs was made on 8th October 1997. 
  
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working too close to a known mine, had his visor raised and had not cleared the area he 
was standing over when he dropped the stone. He may have also felt a pressure to work 
quickly to finish for the day.  His errors went uncorrected. The secondary cause is listed as 
“Victim inattention” because if he was under pressure to work quickly it seems likely that he 
did not think through what he was doing adequately. 
The damage to his hand implies that it was close to the point of detonation, perhaps moving 
to catch the stone as it slipped?   
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The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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